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Abstract
This paper compares two learning processes, namely those gener-
ated by replicator and best-response dynamics, from the point of view
of the asymptotics of play. We base our study on the intersection
of the basins of attraction of locally stable pure Nash equilibria for
replicator and best-response dynamics. Local stability implies that
the basin of attraction has positive measure but there are examples
where the intersection of the basin of attraction for replicator and
best-response dynamics is arbitrarily small. We provide conditions,
involving the existence of an unstable interior Nash equilibrium, for
the basins of attraction of any locally stable pure Nash equilibrium
under replicator and best-response dynamics to intersect in a set of
positive measure. Hence, for any choice of initial conditions in sets
of positive measure, if a pure Nash equilibrium is locally stable, the
outcome of learning under either procedure coincides. We provide ex-
amples illustrating the above, including some for which the basins of
attraction exactly coincide for both learning dynamics. We explore
the role that indifference sets play in the coincidence of the basins of
attraction of the stable Nash equilibria.
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1 Introduction
Learning in games has been drawing researchers’ attention from many view-
points in the hope to predict play. This prediction depends naturally upon
the learning procedure and hence, it becomes interesting to understand how
different learning mechanisms compare to one another. In particular, it is
interesting to understand how predictions are robust to different learning
specifications. We address this question, in a simple continuous time setting,
for models where there is a choice of Nash equilibria by comparing the set of
points that converge to a given Nash equilibrium under two distinct learning
processes.
From an experimental perspective, Erev and Roth (1998) and Roth and
Erev (1995)1 try to establish which model of learning best fits the learning
mechanisms displayed by subjects in experiments. The options are rein-
forcement learning or stochastic fictitious play (or a combination of both).
Considering discrete time modelling, Hopkins (2002) stresses the similarities
between these two learning procedures by showing that, asymptotically, rein-
forcement learning can generate the same result as stochastic fictitious play.
Convergence properties of reinforcement learning have been established by
Beggs (2005), whereas Mengel (2012) shows that a reinforcement learning
across many games can destabilise strict Nash equilibria.
When more than one equilibrium is available, the question of choice
among the Nash equilibria arises. Duffy and Hopkins (2005) show that there
is convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium under both reinforcement learning
and stochastic fictitious play in market entry games.
The present work focusses on the two classic learning procedures of (con-
tinuous-time) best-response (and, implicitly, its time-scaled fictitious play)
and replicator, namely from the point of view of convergence properties.
See Brown (1949), Matsui (1992) and Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003) for
1The bibliographic references presented in this introduction are merely an illustration
of the points made. They do not intend to be comprehensive in any way. Several survey
articles exist already that serve this purpose. See, for instance, Hofbauer (2011), Hofbauer
and Sigmund (2003) or Sandholm (2012).
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recalling the notions of fictitious play, best-response and replicator dynamics,
respectively. This study is particularly relevant when more than one pure
Nash equilibrium is available. It is well-known that Nash equilibria for these
learning procedures are the same. Existence, and even local stability, is
clearly not sufficient for predicting play since the choice of play towards one
or another equilibrium greatly depends on initial conditions. The choices
made from a given initial condition depend upon the basin of attraction
in which they are found. Zhang and Hofbauer (2015) discuss equilibrium
selection in a 2 × 2 coordination game under replicator dynamics. One of
their selection methods compares the size of the basin of attraction of various
equilibria. However, except when a unique equilibrium is globally stable (see
Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009) for examples in the context of stable games),
the basins of attraction of equilibria need not coincide for replicator and
best-response dynamics. Golman and Page (2010) construct a one-parameter
family of 3 × 3 games for which the basins of attraction of one equilibrium,
under the two learning rules (replicator and best-response), intersect in a
set of vanishing measure. Hence, for practical purposes, the two learning
procedures predict very different outcomes of play. In fact, almost all initial
conditions that converge to a given equilibrium under replicator dynamics, do
not do so under best-response dynamics. This result persists in the context
of aggregate behaviour of populations, see Golman (2011).
When more than one pure Nash equilibrium is available as a possible
outcome, in the sense that it is locally stable, we are interested in comparing
the set of points from which an equilibrium is chosen under the two learning
procedures of replicator and best-response. We show that the existence of an
unstable interior Nash equilibrium, together with an invariance assumption,
guarantees that the intersection of the basins of attraction of any locally
stable pure Nash equilibrium under replicator and best-response dynamics
is not arbitrarily small. Hence, with non-vanishing probability, there exist
initial conditions for which learning under replicator produces the same out-
come as learning under best-response. Our results thus offer insight into the
relevance of the existence of a fully mixed Nash equilibrium. The existence of
a fully mixed Nash equilibrium guarantees that there is at least one point in
state space for which a player is indifferent among all actions, or equivalently,
every type is present in the corresponding mix for the population.
The size of the sets of initial conditions from which learning produces the
same outcome under replicator and best-response dynamics is related to the
existence of invariant lines of states at which the player in indifferent between
exactly two strategies. We provide examples illustrating both applications
of our result and the importance of our hypothesis. The latter include a
family of games constructed in Golman and Page (2010) and a new family of
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games created for this purpose. The examples illustrative of our result are
obtained from Zeeman’s (1980) classification of replicator dynamics for 3×3
games. The examples, as developed here, address an open question left by
Zhang and Hofbauer (2015), namely, that of comparing basin dominance of
equilibria under different learning dynamics.
It should be clear that when the basins of attraction for replicator and
best-response dynamics intersect in a set of positive measure, play need not
proceed in the same way, nor need it produce the same asymptotic behaviour,
for both dynamics and from all initial conditions. We show examples where
attraction properties of play coincide exactly, that is, for each initial condition
the same Nash equilibrium is chosen under replicator and best-response dy-
namics. These examples exhibit invariant spaces for both types of dynamics
which divide the state space into invariant regions. Generically, saying that
basins of attraction intersect in a set of positive measure is to say that, with
positive probability, there are initial conditions from which players choose
converging actions. Our examples suggest that the intersection of basins of
attraction of pure Nash equilibria in the presence of a fully mixed Nash equi-
librium is a large subset of state space. Therefore, play under replicator and
best-response dynamics produces the same outcome with high probability.
The next section details the preliminary notions and results required for
reading this article. Section 3 shows that if a fully mixed unstable Nash
equilibrium exists, and an easily verifiable invariance condition holds, then
learning by replicator and best-response dynamics produces the same out-
come for a set of initial conditions that is non-vanishing. This section also
establishes some additional results concerning the two learning mechanisms.
In particular, it provides a sufficient condition for the exact coincidence of
the basins of attraction of a pure Nash equilibrium under both replicator
and best-response dynamics. Section 4 provides some illustrative examples
in 3× 3 games. The final section concludes.
2 Preliminaries
As usual in population dynamics, we assume that the population consists of
n different types and denote by xi, i = 1, . . . , n the frequency of each type. It
is clear that these frequencies must sum to one. Variations in the frequencies
depend on how the fitness of each frequency compares to the average fitness
of the population, when learning occurs by replicator dynamics. Under best-
response dynamics, the update of the frequencies is made by choosing a
best-response to the current mix in the population.
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Denote by ∆ the set of frequency/probability vectors, that is,
∆ = {x ∈ Rn : x1 + . . .+ xn = 1; xi ≥ 0}.
This is the natural state space for the game dynamics we consider. Let ∂∆
denote the boundary of ∆ and int(∆) its interior.
Consider a game described by an n×n matrix A. If the game is played ac-
cording to replicator dynamics (henceforth, RD) then each xi ∈ [0, 1] evolves
according to the following rule
x˙i = xi ((Ax)i − x.Ax) , i = 1, . . . , n. (1)
If, on the other hand, the game is played according to best-response dynamics
(henceforth, BRD) then each state variable follows
x˙i ∈ BR(xi)− xi, i = 1, . . . , n. (2)
We denote by ei, i = 1, . . . , n the unit vectors in ∆ and write BR(x) = ei
when a best-response to x is the choice of action i. We define, for i = 1, . . . , n,
the set
BRi = {x ∈ ∆ : BR(x) = ei}.
Even though BRD is a differential inclusion, it is really a differential
equation except for those points in the indifference sets
Zi,j = {x ∈ ∆ : (Ax)i = (Ax)j}, i 6= j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (3)
It has been shown (see, for instance, Zeeman (1980)) that A can be chosen so
that aii = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n, which we assume to be the case from now on.
Notice that, since the diagonal of A has only zeros, (Ax)i does not depend
on xi for all i = 1, . . . , n. It is also worthwhile to mention that if ek ∈ Zi,j for
some k = 1, . . . , n then the equation for Zi,j does not depend on xk. This is a
consequence of the fact that the equation for Zi,j is homogeneous as follows:
Lemma 2.1. If ek ∈ Zi,j for some k = 1, . . . , n then the equation for Zi,j
does not depend on xk.
Proof. The equation for Zi,j is of the form
n∑
i=1
aixi = 0,
where the real coefficients ai depend on the entries of A. The point ek
written in coordinates is such that xk = 1 and xi = 0 for i 6= k. If ek ∈ Zi,j
then xk = 1 and xi = 0 for i 6= k must solve the equation for Zi,j. Direct
substitution yields ak = 0.
5
Nash equilibria are singularities of the dynamics and coincide under RD
and BRD. If it exists, an interior or fully mixed Nash equilibrium occurs
at the simultaneous intersection of all the indifference sets. We say that a
Nash equilibrium, x, is locally stable if there exists an open neighbourhood,
containing the Nash equilibrium, so that the orbits of points in this neigh-
bourhood are attracted to the Nash equilibrium without leaving a possibly
bigger neighbourhood of x. In the language of dynamical systems, the Nash
equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable. The set of all points whose or-
bit is attracted to the Nash equilibrium is called its basin of attraction. We
distinguish between the basins of attraction of the same Nash equilibrium,
x, for different dynamics by writing BBRD(x) and BRD(x) for the basins of
attraction under BRD and RD, respectively.
There are however points that are singularities of RD but are not Nash
equilibria. According to the definition of a singularity for a differential equa-
tion, these are points for which the right-hand side of (1) vanishes, which
occurs either because xi = 0 or because (Ax)i = x.Ax if xi 6= 0. This mo-
tivates the following definition of a singularity or stationary point for BRD.
With this definition, singularities of RD and BRD coincide, except possibly
at the vertices of ∆. Recall that while ∂∆ is invariant for RD, that need not
be the case for BRD.
Definition 2.2. A point x ∈ ∂∆ is a singularity or stationary point for BRD
if and only if x ∈ Zi,j ∩ {xk = 0 : for all k 6= i, j}.
We assume throughout that
Assumption A: Zi,j 6= Zk,l for all {i, j} 6= {k, l}.
This is a non-degeneracy condition ensuring that a player is not indifferent
to more than two actions at a time, unless it is at a Nash equilibrium.
3 Equivalence of learning outcomes
We use the expression “equivalence of learning outcomes” as a way of ex-
pressing the fact that there is a non-vanishing set of initial conditions from
which RD and BRD converge to the same Nash equilibrium.
We start by pointing out some features of the two types of dynamics,
mostly of geometric nature. Denote by Si the smallest open sector bounded
by indifference sets and containing ei. Note that the best-response is constant
in Si. When ei is a locally stable Nash equilibrium, we have BR(x) = ei
for all x ∈ Si and one of the indifference sets in the boundary of Si is of
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the form Zi,j. In this case, there are no invariant sets for BRD in Si and
Si ⊆ BRi. Given Proposition 5.1 in Hofbauer et al. (2009), stating that the
time-average of orbits of RD must converge to an invariant set under BRD,
time-averages of orbits for RD of points in Si converge to ∂Si, since there
are no sets invariant for BRD in Si.
Recalling Definition 2.2, it is clear that the intersection of the boundary
of Si and that of ∆ contains no other singularities, for RD or BRD, than ei
and, eventually, any singularities in Zi,j ∩ {xk = 0 : k 6= i, j}.
The set Si is non-empty and, under Assumption A, it is a set of positive
measure. Its measure is determined by the space between the indifference
sets of its boundary.
In Figure 1, we illustrate the set Si, for i = 2, for the game depicted in
Figure 7. We choose this game because the indifference sets are generic. The
game belongs to class 62 of the classification in Zeeman (1980), see Section 4
for more detail. The set S2 is the open sector whose boundary is that of ∆
together with the segments of Z1,3 and Z1,2 connecting ∂∆ to the interior
Nash equilibrium. In this case, S2 = S1 but in what follows we use Si only
when ei is a Nash equilibrium. Hence, the choice i = 2.
e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3
Z2,3
S2
Figure 1: The set S2 for a game in class 62 of Zeeman (1980). Full dots indicate
Nash equilibria. The set S2 is the open sector whose boundary is that of ∆ together
with the segments of Z1,3 and Z1,2 connecting ∂∆ to the interior Nash equilibrium.
In this case, S2 = S1.
The next result establishes conditions that guarantee equivalence of learn-
ing outcomes in a game.
Theorem 3.1. Consider a game with a pure locally stable Nash equilibrium,
ei, for which Assumption A holds and such that
(H1) there exists an unstable fully mixed Nash equilibrium, x∗;
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(H2) Si is invariant
2 for RD.
Then, BRD(ei) ∩ BBRD(ei) is a set of positive measure containing Si.
Proof. The existence of a fully mixed Nash equilibrium in Hypothesis (H1)
and Assumption A ensure the existence of points arbitrarily close to x∗ which
belong to Si ⊆ BRi. Let x be such a point. Then BR(x) = ei and
d
dt
(
xi
xj
)
=
xi
xj
[(Ax)i − (Ax)j ] > 0
since x ∈ BRi implies (Ax)i > (Ax)j for all j 6= i. Hence, the ratio xi(t)/xj(t)
increases with t for all j 6= i. The invariance condition in Hypothesis (H2)
then implies that the orbit of x under RD remains in Si.
In view of Proposition 5.1 in Hofbauer et al. (2009) and the local stability
of ei for both dynamics, the time-average of the orbit of x under RD must
converge to ei ∈ ∂∆, and so does the orbit of x under RD. In fact, Proposition
5.1 establishes not just the invariance of the limit of time-averages of orbits
of RD but also that this limit must be internally chain transitive3. Chain-
transitivity, together with the fact that the ratio xi(t)/xj(t) is increasing in
Si, excludes the possibility of the limit of the time-average of RD being the
whole of ∂∆. Because for points in the intersection of the closure of Si with
∂∆ the best-response is still ei, there are no other attractors and the time-
average of RD converges to ei. Since the time-average of RD converges to a
pure equilibrium, then so does the trajectory itself.
Note that convergence to ei of the orbit of x under RD holds for all x ∈ Si.
Hence, Si ⊂ BRD(ei) ∩ BBRD(ei).
The fact that, because of Assumption A, the measure of Si is positive
finishes the proof.
Equivalence of learning outcomes in one-parameter families of games fol-
lows from Theorem 3.1. It suffices to notice that both the existence of an
interior Nash equilibrium and the invariance of Si are robust under pertur-
bation of a game.
2The invariance of Si is readily checked by looking at the best-response on either
side of its boundaries. Using Figure 1 as an illustration, if between the boundary of S2
consisting of Z1,2 and the part of Z2,3 immediately above it the best-response is e1 then
S2 is invariant. If, on the other hand, the best-response for the same set of points is e3
then S2 is not invariant.
3According to Hofbauer et al. (2009), “a set A is internally chain transitive if any two
points x, y ∈ A can be connected by finitely many arbitrarily long pieces of orbits lying
completely within A with arbitrarily small jumps between them”. A precise definition can
be found in Bena¨ım et al. (2005).
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Recall that an interior Nash equilibrium is fully mixed in the sense that
every type is present in the corresponding mix for the population, that is,
every type has positive frequency. Continuity of play ensures that given any
type there exist points near the Nash equilibrium for which this type has
positive frequency. Then, for a Nash equilibrium, there exist initial condi-
tions for which the corresponding type is present. If this type determines a
Nash equilibrium, its basins of attraction under the two different dynamics
intersect in a non-vanishing set. Recall that when a given type is a best-
response, the frequency of this type increases under both dynamics. The size
of BRD(ei) ∩ BBRD(ei) is bounded below by the size of Si which depends on
the relative position of the indifference sets that constitute its boundary.
We note that when the pure Nash equilibrium is a uniformly ESS, a
stronger notion used by Golman and Page (2010) in their Erratum4, we can
use their Theorem 2 to obtain a much shorter proof. This theorem states that
a pure Nash equilibrium which is uniformly ESS and whose action a is a best-
response for a set of points of at most measure zero, has basins of attraction
for RD and BRD with vanishing intersection. Such an action is said to have
the Never an Initial Best Response Property. Equivalently, the result can
be stated as follows: let a be an action such that a =BR(x) for x in a set
of positive measure; then, if x∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium, uniformly ESS,
corresponding to a, the intersection of the basins of attraction of x∗ for RD
and BRD is not arbitrarily small. Note that for games satisfying Theorem 3.1
the action a in Golman and Page (2010) does not satisfy the Never an Initial
Best Response Property and therefore the basins of attraction for the two
dynamics intersect in a set of positive measure.
3.1 Invariant indifference sets
When some indifference sets are invariant for either or both learning mech-
anisms, further information on the equivalence of learning outcomes can be
obtained. We start with a sufficient condition for invariance. The following
result generalizes that proved by Ochea (2010) in Chapter 2, Lemma 3 in the
particular case of a 3× 3 coordination game under RD.
Lemma 3.2. Let Zi,j be an indifference set of an n × n game. If ek ∈ Zi,j
for all k 6= i, j then Zi,j is invariant under RD.
Proof. Let x ∈ Zi,j. According to equation (3), we have (Ax)i = (Ax)j and
therefore,
x˙i
xi
=
x˙j
xj
.
4The definition of uniformly ESS may be found in page 73 of Golman and Page (2010).
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Integrating with respect to t, we obtain for all t
log xi(t)− log xi(0) = log xj(t)− log xj(0)⇔ xi(t) =
xi(0)
xj(0)
xj(t).
Since ek ∈ Zi,j for all k 6= i, j, the equation for Zi,j is of the form xi/xj =
K ∈ R (see Lemma 2.1). The fact that x ∈ Zi,j finishes the proof.
As a consequence, we establish a sufficient condition which prevents the
occurrence of cyclic behaviour in n×n games. When cyclic behaviour occurs
the frequency of each type increases and decreases in turn. See Figure 2 (left)
for an illustration.
Proposition 3.3. In a n× n game for which there exist n− 2 indifference
sets such that ek ∈ Zi,j for k 6= i, j, RD exhibits no cyclic behaviour.
Proof. Cyclic behaviour is dependent on the existence of an interior Nash
equilibrium at which the Jacobian matrix has at least one pair of complex
eigenvalues. Since, by Lemma 3.2, such a Zi,j is invariant for RD, it is the
eigenspace for some eigenvalue. This ensures the existence of n − 2 real
eigenvalues. Since the state space ∆ is (n − 1)-dimensional, all eigenvalues
must be real.
Note that Zi,j is usually not invariant for RD. It is invariant for BRD
generically only at points x for which BR(x) = ei and BR(x) = ej. However,
under the hypothesis of Proposition 3.3, Zi,j becomes invariant for BRD as
well. This is because at the points where it is usually not invariant, the
best-response now contains ek and ek ∈ Zi,j for k 6= i, j.
Proposition 3.3, when applied to 3× 3 games, contributes with a correc-
tion to Zeeman’s diagram for class 61 as we show in the next section. In
the context of 3 × 3 games, Proposition 3.3 states that provided that one
indifference set is invariant there is no cyclic behaviour.
Recall that Zi,j divides ∆ into two connected components. The invari-
ance of these connected components for RD follows from that of the set Zi,j,
provided no other singularities exist in these connected components. A con-
dition leading to the invariance of the connected components is thus provided
by Lemma 3.2. In this case, ei, ej /∈ Zi,j may be Nash equilibria outside Zi,j.
Theorem 3.4. Let ei be a locally stable pure Nash equilibrium, assume that
Assumption A holds, that ei /∈ Zi,j and that the connected components of
∆\Zi,j are invariant for RD and BRD. Then BBRD(ei) = BRD(ei).
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Proof. Since Zi,j divides ∆ into two invariant connected components and
ei /∈ Zi,j, ei belongs to one of the invariant connected components. For x
in the connected component containing ei it is BR(x) = ei and hence, there
are no other invariant sets in this connected component. Then, the orbit of
x under RD also converges to ei (as in the proof of Theorem 3.1), finishing
the proof.
Even though Theorem 3.4 is not stated for non-pure Nash equilibria on the
boundary, the cases illustrated by Figures 7 and 8 show that an analogous
result may apply. This is beyond the scope of the present article as the
interior of the boundary can accommodate complicated dynamics around a
Nash equilibrium in higher dimensions.
4 Examples
We illustrate our results by looking at all possible 3×3 games. These games
have been divided by Zeeman (1980) into 19 classes. Not all of these classes
correspond to games with one fully mixed Nash equilibrium and at least one
pure Nash equilibrium. In fact, the games belonging to classes 2, 3, −42,
−63, −64, 73, 8, −92 and −102 do not have a fully mixed Nash equilibrium,
and the games in class 1 do not have pure Nash equilibria, see Figure 11 in
Zeeman (1980). We illustrate the equivalence of learning outcomes for the
remaining eight classes, thus completely addressing all 3 × 3 games where
establishing equivalence of learning outcomes (or lack thereof) makes sense.
Since we are interested in illustrating learning procedures that lead to a
pure Nash equilibrium, we use the symmetric matrix to that considered in
Zeeman (1980) whenever we want to change the stability of the interior Nash
equilibrium from stable to unstable. We note that Zeeman’s classification is
robust in the sense that small perturbations of the matrices defining the
game lead to qualitatively equivalent dynamics. The symmetric of a matrix
is obtained by multiplication of all entries by (−1). This interchanges the
stability of the singularities in the game. By presenting here the diagrams
for BRD, we illustrate how large the intersection of the basins of attraction
for the two dynamics is. We restrict our attention to the cases relevant in the
illustration of Theorems 3.1 and 3.4. In Table 1 we list the classes and the
matrices we use for our illustration, preserving the order of Zeeman (1980).
The line below each matrix indicates whether there is a sign reversal with
respect to the matrix used by Zeeman (1980). We choose to reverse the sign
of the elements in the matrix when this creates more stable pure equilibria
than the original matrix, and the interior Nash equilibrium becomes unstable.
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Class 51 61
Matrix A

 0 −3 1−1 0 −1
−3 1 0



 0 −1 −11 0 −3
−1 −1 0


Sign reversal yes yes
Class 71 101
Matrix A

 0 6 −4−3 0 5
−1 3 0



 0 −1 −1−1 0 −1
−1 −1 0


Sign reversal no yes
Class 41 62
Matrix A

 0 −3 1−3 0 1
−1 −1 0



 0 −1 −31 0 −5
−1 −3 0


Sign reversal yes yes
Class 72 91
Matrix A

 0 1 −1−1 0 1
−1 1 0



 0 −1 3−1 0 3
1 1 0


Sign reversal no no
Table 1: Zeeman’s classes and their matrices. We indicate the existence of a
sign reversal with respect to the matrix originally used by Zeeman.
A straightforward calculation shows that the indifference sets for BRD
for each class in Table 1 are given in Table 2. For classes 61, 101, 41, 72 and
91 there is at least one indifference set which is invariant. The invariant in-
difference sets provide a bound for the basins of attraction of Nash equilibria
for RD provided the Nash equilibrium is not on the indifference set. In this
case, the basins of attraction coincide under both learning procedures and
the question of basin dominance in Zhang and Hofbauer (2015) has the same
answer in both replicator and best-response dynamics.
Although Proposition 3.3 is not an equivalence, we do observe the exis-
tence of cyclic behaviour in the games in the remaining classes. The cyclic
behaviour in RD corresponds also to cyclic BRD.
In Figures 2 – 9, we show the phase diagrams for RD and BRD for the
above classes. The diagram for class 61 for RD is here corrected as there is
no cyclic behaviour. This is a consequence of Proposition 3.3 but can also
be checked directly by computing the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix for
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Class 51 61
Z1,2 x1 − 3x2 + 2x3 = 0 x1 + x2 − 2x3 = 0
Z1,3 3x1 − 4x2 + x3 = 0 x1 = x3
Z2,3 2x1 − x2 − x3 = 0 2x1 + x2 − 3x3 = 0
Class 71 101
Z1,2 3x1 + 6x2 − 9x3 = 0 x1 = x2
Z1,3 x1 + 3x2 − 4x3 = 0 x1 = x3
Z2,3 2x1 + 3x2 − 5x3 = 0 x2 = x3
Class 41 62
Z1,2 x1 = x2 x1 + x2 − 2x3 = 0
Z1,3 x1 − 2x2 + x3 = 0 x1 + 2x2 − 3x3 = 0
Z2,3 2x1 − x2 − x3 = 0 2x1 + 3x2 − 5x3 = 0
Class 72 91
Z1,2 x1 + x2 − x3 = 0 x1 = x2
Z1,3 x1 = x3 x1 + 2x2 − 3x3 = 0
Z2,3 x2 = x3 2x1 + x2 − 3x3 = 0
Table 2: The indifference sets for the classes of Table 1 consist of points
satisfying the equation in each line.
RD at the interior Nash equilibrium.
e1 e2
e3
Z1,2 Z1,3 Z2,3 e1 e2
e3
Z1,2 Z1,3 Z2,3
(1)
(2)
(3)
Figure 2: RD (left) and BRD (right) for class 51. There is only one stable Nash
equilibrium, e1. For RD, its basin of attraction is ∆ except for the points on the
stable manifold of e1,2. For BRD, the only points that may not converge to e1 are
those on Z1,2 below the interior Nash equilibrium.
In all the figures we use a full dot to indicate a stable Nash equilibrium and
an open dot to indicate the Nash equilibrium is unstable. We do not mark
the interior Nash equilibrium in order to preserve the clarity of the figures.
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e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3
Z2,3
e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3
Z2,3
(1)
(2)
(3)
Figure 3: RD (left) and BRD (right) for class 61. There are two stable Nash equi-
libria, e2 and e3. For RD, the line Z1,3 is invariant and constitutes the boundary of
the basins of attraction of e2 and e3. For BRD, the boundary between the basins of
attraction of e2 and e3 is the part of Z1,3 above the interior Nash equilibrium and
the part of Z2,3 to the right of the interior Nash equilibrium. Hence, e2 attracts
more initial conditions under BRD than under RD.
e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3
Z2,3
e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3
Z2,3
(1)
(2)
(3)
Figure 4: RD (left) and BRD (right) for class 71 . There are two stable Nash
equilibria but only e1 is pure. Its basin of attraction is much larger under BRD
than under RD.
It is easy to see this lies on the intersection of all the indifference lines. We
use a full line for indicating Z1,2, a dashed line for Z1,3 and a dotted line for
Z2,3. When the indifference lines are invariant, we place arrows on them to
indicate the direction of play. For RD, we present non-invariant indifference
lines in grey. For BRD, we use grey when there is no change in the best-
response along the indifference line. Also for BRD, we indicate in brackets
the action which constitutes a best-response in the set of points bounded by
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e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3 Z2,3
e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3 Z2,3
(1) (2)
(3)
Figure 5: RD (left) and BRD (right) for class 101. All three pure strategies are
Nash equilibria. Their basins of attraction totally coincide under both dynamics.
This is because all three indifference sets are invariant and the boundary of the
basins of attraction is made of parts of these indifference sets.
e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3Z2,3
e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3Z2,3
(1) (2)
(3)
Figure 6: RD (left) and BRD (right) for class 41. The two stable Nash equilibria
are e1 and e2. Their basins of attraction under RD and BRD coincide as they are
divided by Z1,2, which is the stable manifold of the interior Nash equilibrium.
black parts of indifference lines. As the boundary of ∆ is invariant under
RD, we indicate with arrows the direction of the flow on ∂∆. We denote by
ei,j the Nash equilibrium in Zi,j ∩ {xk = 0; k 6= i, j}.
The class in Figure 2 does not satisfy Hypothesis (H2) in Theorem 3.1.
The class in Figure 4 does not satisfy any of the hypotheses in the same the-
orem. In both cases, the interior Nash equilibrium has complex eigenvalues.
We note that the instability of the interior Nash equilibrium in Figure 2 suf-
fices to produce highly coincident basins of attraction. However, in Figure 2,
not all points in S1 belong to BRD(e1) since some converge to the intersection
of Z1,2 with ∂∆. We note that S1 is not invariant for RD in this case. The
class in Figure 4 is used in Subsection 4.1 to construct a family of games with
an interior Nash equilibrium for which BRD(e1) and BBRD(e1) have vanishing
intersection.
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e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3
Z2,3
e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3
Z2,3(1)
(2)
(3)
Figure 7: RD (left) and BRD (right) for class 62. There are two stable Nash
equilibria, e2 and e3. Even though the intersection of the basins of attraction
under RD and BRD is a set of positive measure, they are different. For RD, the
stable manifold of the interior Nash equilibrium divides the basin of attraction of
e2 from that of e3. For BRD, this division is made by Z2,3 to the left of the interior
Nash equilibrium and Z1,3 to its right.
e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3 Z2,3
e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3 Z2,3
(1)
(2)
(3)
Figure 8: RD (left) and BRD (right) for class 72. There are two stable Nash
equilibria but only e1 is pure. The basins of attraction of e1 and e2,3 are the same
under RD and BRD and are bounded by the invariant set Z1,3.
Figures 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9 show invariant indifference sets. This is not
sufficient to ensure that the basins of attraction exactly coincide under RD
and BRD. However, these do coincide in Figures 5, 6, 8 and 9, where for each
Nash equilibrium on the boundary there is an invariant indifference set that
does not contain the Nash equilibrium, illustrating Theorem 3.4. Note that,
in Figures 6 and 9, one invariant indifference line is enough to guarantee the
coincidence of the basins of attraction for both dynamics. This is insufficient
in Figure 3, where one pure Nash equilibrium belongs to the only invariant
indifference set. In Figure 5 all indifference lines are invariant and it is then
clear that the basins of attraction must coincide.
Figure 7 illustrates the game already used in Figure 1. Even though the
intersection of the basins of attraction of e2 and e3 under RD and BRD is
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e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3 Z2,3
e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3 Z2,3
(1) (2)
(3)
Figure 9: RD (left) and BRD (right) for class 91. The two stable equilibria are
e1,3 and e2,3. Their basins of attraction under RD and BRD coincide and their
boundary is the invariant indifference set Z1,2.
a set of positive measure, they are different. For RD, the stable manifold of
the interior Nash equilibrium divides the basin of attraction of e2 from that
of e3. For BRD, this division is made by Z2,3 to the left of the interior Nash
equilibrium and Z1,3 to its right. Observe that S2 ⊂ BRD(e2) ∩ BBRD(e2).
We illustrate the convergence to equilibrium for classes 41 and 62 corre-
sponding to Figures 6 and 7, respectively. In Figure 10, the BRD and RD
are illustrated for class 41. For BRD the figure depicts the trajectory from
several distinct initial conditions whereas for RD we plot the vector field
(using Mathematica). In Figure 11, we illustrate the same but for class 62.
e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3Z2,3
e2e1
e3
Figure 10: RD (left) and BRD (right) for class 41.
Recall that in class 41 the basins of attraction of e1 and e2 coincide for
both types of dynamics and this is clear from Figure 10. That the intersection
of the basins of attraction for RD and BRD contains a set of positive measure
for class 62 is also clear from Figure 11.
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e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3
Z2,3
e3
e2e1
Figure 11: RD (left) and BRD (right) for class 62.
4.1 Basins of attraction with vanishing intersection
We present two families of games for which a pure Nash equilibrium has
basins of attraction for RD and BRD with vanishing intersection. The first
example has no fully mixed Nash equilibrium and was presented by Gol-
man and Page (2010). To illustrate the fact that the existence of a fully
mixed Nash equilibrium is not sufficient for the non-vanishing intersection of
the basins of attraction, we construct an example with a fully mixed Nash
equilibrium and such that the basins of attraction for RD and BRD have
vanishing intersection. This example consists in a family containing class 71
for n = 1.
An example with no fully mixed Nash equilibrium: Consider the
example presented by Golman and Page (2010). The matrix defining the
family of games is

 1 −N −N
−1
2−N3 2 2
0 0 0

 ; N > 1.
Subtracting 1 from the first column and 2 from the second, we obtain the
equivalent family defined by

 0 −N − 2 −N
−1
1−N3 0 2
−1 −2 0

 ,
which belongs to class 6 of Zeeman’s classification (Zeeman 1980). There are
no invariant indifference lines and the intersection of the indifference lines
occurs outside the simplex, that is, there is no interior Nash equilibrium.
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There are four Nash equilibria: e1, e2, e1,2 and e1,3. The pure Nash equilibria
are locally stable. The indifference lines depend on N and are given by
Z1,2 = {x ∈ ∆ : (N
3 − 1)x1 − (N + 2)x2 −
2N + 1
N
x3 = 0}
Z1,3 = {x ∈ ∆ : x1 −Nx2 −
1
N
x3 = 0}
Z2,3 = {x ∈ ∆ : (2−N
3)x1 + 2x2 + 2x3 = 0}.
As N → +∞ the indifference lines Z1,2 and Z2,3 move closer to the side of ∆
connecting e2 to e3 whereas Z1,3 moves closer to the side of ∆ connecting e1
to e2. As illustrated in Figure 12, for BRD the basins of attraction of e1 and
e2 are divided by Z1,3, while for RD these basins of attraction are divided
by the invariant manifold connecting e1,2 and e1,3. As N → +∞, Z1,3 moves
so that, for BRD, the basin of attraction of e1 shrinks while the invariant
manifold connecting e1,2 and e1,3 moves so that, for RD, the same basin takes
up almost all of ∆.
Comparing this with Figure 7 helps understand the role of the interior
Nash equilibrium. In Figure 7, the basins of attraction for RD and BRD
differ as much as the invariant line Z2,3 differs from an invariant manifold for
RD. In this case, however, the invariant manifold connects the interior Nash
equilibrium, which also belongs to Z2,3, and therefore cannot be transformed
away from Z2,3. The next example shows the importance of this feature of
the invariant manifold for the equivalence of learning outcomes.
e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3
Z2,3
e1,3
e1,2
e1 e2
e3
Z1,2
Z1,3
Z2,3
(1)
(2)
(3)
Figure 12: RD (left) and BRD (right) for the family of games in (Golman and
Page 2010). For RD the basins of attraction of e1 and e2 are divided by the
invariant manifold connecting e1,2 and e1,3. For BRD the basins of attraction of
e1 and e2 are divided by Z1,3. As N → +∞, the invariant manifold moves towards
∂∆ along the line from e2 to e3, whereas Z1,3 moves towards ∂∆ along the line
from e1 to e3.
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An example with a fully mixed Nash equilibrium: Consider the
learning mechanisms defined by the following family of matrices
An =


0 6 −(3n + 1)/n
−(2n + 1)/n 0 5
−1/n 3 0

 ; n ∈ N.
For n = 1 we recover the matrix used by Zeeman (1980) for class 71, whose
dynamics are illustrated in Figure 4. It is easy to check that the Nash
equilibria are again the interior Nash equilibrium, e1 and a point e1,3 =
((3n+ 1)/(3n+ 2), 0, 1/(3n+ 2)). This latter Nash equilibrium converges to
e1 as n → +∞. Otherwise, the dynamics are qualitatively equivalent to
those in Figure 4. However, the basin of attraction of e1 under RD converges
to a set of measure zero. In fact, BRD(e1) is bounded by the edge [e1, e2] and
by the invariant connection [e2 → e1,3]. Because e1,3 tends to e1 this bound
of BRD(e1) tends to the edge [e1, e2]. BRD remains qualitatively unchanged.
For RD almost all initial conditions lead to the interior Nash equilibrium
whereas, for BRD, a set of positive measure of initial conditions chooses to
e1 instead, as n→ +∞.
Recall that the interior Nash equilibrium is stable and S1 is not invariant
under RD so that this family does not satisfy the hypotheses in Theorem 3.1.
5 Concluding remarks
This article contributes to a better understanding of learning by two clas-
sic processes, replicator and best-response, by exposing the importance of
the player’s indifference among all possible strategies. In particular, even
though the initial conditions of play leading to a given pure Nash equilib-
rium may differ according to whether learning proceeds through replicator or
best-response, if the pure Nash equilibrium is locally stable, the existence of
a fully mixed unstable Nash equilibrium, together with an invariance condi-
tion, guarantees that there is always a non-vanishing set from which learning
produces the same pure Nash equilibrium as an outcome, regardless of the
learning mechanism. The existence of the interior Nash equilibrium means
that all types are present in the population mix (or equivalently, that players
are indifferent among all possible actions). The instability of this Nash equi-
librium and the invariance property of the set Si containing the pure Nash
equilibrium indicate that arbitrarily close to total indifference, the type char-
acterising the pure Nash equilibrium is prefered.
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Our results also point towards some similarity between the two learning
mechanisms and furthermore show the role of the invariance of the indiffer-
ence sets in maximising this similarity. However, when the basins of attrac-
tion differ, their geometry allows room for further research on understanding
these differences and their causes. This may also shed some light on the
transient behaviour of trajectories, a subject beyond the scope of the present
article. Hopefully, experiments will provide further insight.
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